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Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of the political and economic context under which Mexico’s 
Progresa-Oportunidades was introduced to prelude the emergence of social assistance in Latin 
America. The paper identifies four distinctive features of the programme that were revolutionary in 
their own right. First, the Progresa-Oportunidades embraced a multidimensional approach to 
poverty, linking income transfers with simultaneous interventions in health, education and nutrition. 
Second, the programme focused on the poor. This is in clear contrast to generalised food subsidies 
and other targeted interventions that dominated the antipoverty agenda in the past. Third, the 
programme followed a complex system of identification and selection of beneficiaries to prevent 
discretionary political manipulation of public funds. Finally, an independent impact evaluation 
protocol proved to be critical for both improving the programme’s effectiveness and strengthening 
its legitimacy across different political factions and constituencies. The paper concludes that the 
success of Progresa-Oportunidades must be understood in a broader context, where a harsh 
economic and political environment, coupled with a rapid democratisation and increasing political 
competition, laid down the foundations for the introduction and then sustained expansion of the 
programme.  
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1.  Introduction  
 
At the turn of the century, social protection emerged as a new paradigm that shifted the antipoverty 
policy agenda in Latin America – and in the global South as a whole, from conventional approaches 
to food aid, subsidies and other forms of ‘safety-nets’ to regular, reliable and predictable forms of 
assistance. This new paradigm, described elsewhere as a ‘quiet revolution’ (Barrientos and Hulme, 
2008), is currently reaching and changing the lives of more than 860 million people worldwide, 25 
percent of whom live in Latin America and the Caribbean (see Table 2 below). This means that 
social assistance has become the most important policy instrument against extreme deprivation at 
the present time. The shift in policy thinking reflects an emerging consensus that eradicating 
poverty requires economic growth, basic service provision and social protection. It also reflects a 
shift in the conventional wisdom on the nature and causes of poverty, moving from poverty as a 
lack of income to notions of poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon. 
 
The International Labor Organisation (ILO) divides the notion of social protection into three general 
categories: social insurance; labour market regulation; and social assistance. Social insurance 
includes contributory schemes designed to protect workers against life-course and work-related 
contingencies. Labour market regulations are legal frameworks aimed at ensuring minimum 
standards for employment and safeguarding workers’ rights. Social assistance includes tax-
financed policy instruments designed to address poverty and vulnerability (ILO, 2001). In this 
paper, I discuss social protection with an explicit focus on social assistance, as it represents the 
most significant changes to the social protection systems in Latin America over the last decade. In 
particular, I will focus on one of the earliest and perhaps most studied social assistance 
programmes in the developing world: Mexico’s Progresa (later renamed Oportunidades). In the 
paper, the programme, hereafter referred to as Progresa-Oportunidades, is identified for having 
been revolutionary in at least four important respects. 
 
First, the programme embraces, by design, a multidimensional approach to poverty. It links income 
transfers with simultaneous interventions in health, education and nutrition, placing a strong 
emphasis on tackling the intergenerational transmission mechanisms of poverty through human 
capital investment. The programme requires parents sending their children to school and attending 
periodical health checkups in exchange for income transfers that support expenditures on 
schooling, health and nutrition. In Section 4 I discuss the design features of Progresa-
Oportunidades in more detail.  
 
The ‘human development’ approach to social assistance has expanded rapidly in Latin America 
and beyond, with over 30 countries with large-scale programmes in place (Fiszbein and Schady, 
2009). Barrientos, Niño-Zarazúa and Maitrot (2010) also report a number of pilot schemes 
emerging particularly in the sub-Saharan African region, with pilot projects already introduced in 
Kenya, Malawi, Ghana and Zambia; and at implementation stage in Nigeria, Liberia, Uganda and 
Tanzania. Second, one of the most distinctive features of Progresa-Oportunidades is its focus on 
the poor. This is in clear contrast to generalised food subsidies and other targeted interventions that 
dominated the antipoverty agenda in the past, and which were regarded as being highly regressive, 
and had high leakages to the non-poor (Levy, 2006). Third, Progresa-Oportunidades followed a 
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complex and statistically-based system of identification and selection of beneficiaries at the 
household level, with the specific objectives of improving the efficacy of policy outreach and 
preventing discretionary manipulation associated with opportunistic political behaviour and 
clientelism, as occurred with previous anti-poverty policies. That would ensure, it was assumed, 
that public resources distributed through Progresa-Oportunidades would be directed to those in 
most need, i.e. households in extreme poverty. Fourth, but not least, Progresa-Oportunidades 
included an independent impact evaluation protocol that included the academic research 
community both nationally and internationally. That helped not only in improving the programme’s 
effectiveness over time, but also in strengthening its legitimacy across different political factions 
and constituencies (Skoufias, 2005).  
 
These four elements are found at different levels in transfer programmes that have adopted the 
human development approach of Progresa-Oportunidades. The scale, coverage, transfer size, 
regularity of transfers, and the duration and timing of support can also be associated with broader 
political and economic factors, and well-grounded theoretical principles underpinning the design 
and implementation of the programme. In the remaining of this paper I discuss this broader picture. 
Section 2 discusses the political and economic conditions that preceded the emergence of 
Progresa-Oportunidades, and which help explain the shift in the antipoverty policy agenda in 
Mexico. Section 3 discusses the principles and design features that characterise this type of policy 
interventions. Section 4 analyses institutional design features, whereas Section 5 reviews the 
existing evidence on the impacts of Progresa-Oportunidades and other social assistance 
programmes in Latin America, with a specific focus on human capital and poverty. Section 6 
concludes with a brief discussion on the key policy lessons. 
 
2. Shifting the antipoverty policy agenda in Mexico: the emergence of Progresa-
Oportunidades  
 
Mexico’s Progresa was launched in August 1997, two years after the country experienced one of 
the most difficult political and economic crisis in more than five decades. In January 1994, the 
uprising of the Zapatista Army for National Liberation in the southern state of Chiapas coincided 
with a series of events, notably the assassination of the Presidential candidate of the ruling 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in March that year. These events generated great political 
uncertainty that contributed to trigger the Peso crisis of December 1994 (Gil-Diaz and Carstens, 
1996). The setback of seven percent in real GDP in 1995 had a devastating impact on household 
welfare. The headcount index (or poverty incidence) associated with a food-based poverty line 
soared from 21.2 percent just before the crisis to 37.4 percent in 1996.1  
 
                                                 
1 Two additional poverty lines are used in Mexico: A capabilities-based poverty line that includes, as well as 
the food-based basket, other expenditure items such as health care, education, clothing, housing and public 
transport. If adopting that poverty threshold, the headcount index increases from 30 percent in 1994 to 47 
percent in 1996. The third poverty line is asset-based, and results from adding up to the food-based basket 
the mean value of non-food expenditure of households belonging to the lowest 10th percentile. When this 
poverty line is adopted, the poverty incidence in Mexico raise from 52.4 percent just before the crisis to 69 
percent in 1996. For more details, see Secretaria De Desarrollo Social (2002). 
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In the aftermath of the crisis, the incoming Zedillo administration (1994-2000) was faced with limited 
capacity to assist the poor, for two important reasons: one the one hand, severe budgetary 
restrictions resulting from the slowdown of the economy and austerity measures meant that the 
government had very little room for manoeuvre to increase social spending; on the other hand, 
most antipoverty policies at the time consisted of generalised and targeted food and in-kind 
subsidies that reached just a fraction of the poor. Indeed, more than 75 percent of the total budget 
for subsidised food consumption was allocated in urban areas, despite the fact that nearly 60 
percent of the poor lived in rural communities. That meant that a large percentage of the income 
transfer distributed through food subsidies were captured by the non-poor (Levy, 2006). As a result, 
the temporary measures adopted to offset the impact of the crisis had very limited effectiveness, 
particularly amongst the poorest.  
 
The other social policy available, the National Solidarity Programme (Pronasol) – a matching grant 
programme for financing small and medium-sized infrastructure and social projects, introduced by 
President Salinas de Gortari to compensate the adverse effects and vulnerabilities associated with 
the rapid market liberalisation and structural change of the 1980s, lost legitimacy, as it was heavily 
criticised for its political manipulation by the ruling PRI during the Presidential election of 1994 
(Molinar Horcasitas and Weldon, 1994).2  
 
2.1 Political considerations 
 
Political manipulation in the distribution of social spending in Mexico had been more of a norm than 
an exception, particularly in the absence of clear and effective transparency and accountability 
rules. Practices of this sort have also been reported from other incumbent governments in Latin 
America and industrialised countries. For example, Schady (2000) finds that during Alberto 
Fujimori’s administration, an increased expenditure of Peru’s social fund Foncodes was given to 
provinces where his party had received support in previous elections. Gibson and Calvo (2000) 
show that the government of Carlos Menem in Argentina manipulated social spending to gain 
support at Congress to introduce economic reforms. Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) also find 
strong evidence of a skewed distribution of municipality grants towards regions with large 
proportions of swing voters during the Swedish 1998 election.  
 
In a context of rapid democratisation and increasing political competition, the Zedillo administration 
decided to reform the rules of antipoverty policy to improve the transparency and efficiency of those 
systems (Escobar Latapi, 2002). In particular the government began a process of decentralisation 
that culminated in a new law (Law of Fiscal Coordination), in which funding decisions on public 
infrastructure such as schools, health clinics and rural roads were taken at state and municipality 
level and allocated on non-discretionary principles, on the basis of statistical poverty indicators 
(Somuano et al., 2006). These reforms, in addition to the introduction of Progresa-Oportunidades, 
signalled a major shift in antipoverty policy thinking in Mexico. In particular, a major change in 
policy was the focus on households rather than on communities. Progresa-Oportunidades aimed, 
by design, at promoting a direct relationship between the federal government and the recipient 
                                                 
2 Studies have found strong correlations between allocation of Pronasol funds and political outcomes. 
Overall, evidence suggests that Pronasol was used to mobilise PRI’s electoral machinery to gain support 
from both core and swing constituencies. For further discussion, see: Dion (2000). 
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households, whilst explicitly limiting the involvement of local governments and civil society 
organisations. This had the objective of preventing the reproduction of corporatist, authoritarian and 
clientelistic practices that peasants’ cooperatives, rural workers’ unions and community 
associations have shown in the past (Dagnino et al., 2006, Levy and Rodríguez, 2004). And 
although some private intermediaries were involved in the beginning of the operation of the 
programme, from 2002 onwards, the entire operation was under coordination of a federal 
coordinating agency without the participation of any civil organisation. At the same time, civil 
society organisations showed no particular interest in overseeing or taking part in the programme, 
as there were no economic incentives and/or means to cover fees, commissions and other 
administration costs. They left most activities to the federal coordinating agency (Hevia de la Jara, 
2008). 
 
2.2 Financing issues  
 
It is worth noting that Progresa-Oportunidades gradually replaced previous food subsidies that were 
ineffective in reaching out to the poor. That was a key policy decision, as the introduction of 
Progresa-Oportunidades on the top of food subsidies would have simply been unfeasible under 
conditions of limited fiscal resources. Levy (2006) has pointed out the importance of the presidential 
leadership in phasing out food subsidies that had been in place for over two decades. The 
substitution of social policies helped the government to avoid additional pressures on the federal 
budget. 
 
Financing has emerged as a key constraint in discussions on extending social assistance, 
particularly in low-income countries. Tax revenues are a major source for financing social 
assistance. In low- and lower middle-income countries, taxes represent about 80 percent of 
government revenues, followed by revenues from property income, sales of goods and services, 
international aid, and property income (IMF, 2009). Low-income countries in particular face heavy 
constraints on their capacity to improve tax collection systems. These constraints are associated 
with the structure of the economy – the rural subsistence economy and the informal sector are very 
difficult to tax – as well as with the administrative capacity of revenue authorities (see Barrientos 
and Niño-Zarazúa, forthcoming-b).  
 
Budgetary considerations have contributed to making the global coverage of social assistance 
largely skewed towards middle-income countries. The mean spending on social assistance in Latin 
America is in the order of one percent of GDP, although that proportion is conditional on the size of 
economy, the efficiency of tax collection systems and the scale and scope of the interventions. So 
while upper middle-income countries, such as Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay, spend 
less than one percent of GDP in social assistance, lower middle-income countries, such as Bolivia 
and Honduras, allocate more than two percent of GDP (Grosh et al., 2008). In particular, Progresa-
Oportunidades absorb just a fraction of Mexico’s GDP, about 0.3 percent, and that proportion is 
expected to diminish under positive economic growth and a sustained reduction in poverty.  
 
It is worth pointing out here the fact that although the programme was ‘home-made’ and financed 
with domestic resources during the first years of operation, the international community, via the 
Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, supported the expansion of the programme 
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later on, with credit and technical assistance, especially after the political transition of 2000.3 But 
most importantly, the international community played a significant role in the dissemination and 
replication of similar programmes with a human development focus across the developing world. 
Overall, the economic crisis of 1994-1995, coupled with a number of factors, notably a process of 
rapid democratisation and political competition and a reallocation of budgetary resources, laid down 
the conditions for the introduction of Progresa-Oportunidades. In the following section, I briefly 
discuss the principles and objectives underpinning the programme, whereas in Section 4 attention 
is paid to relevant institutional design features. 
 
3.  Principles and programme objectives 
 
Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades, as many other human development programmes in Latin 
America – also referred to in the literature as conditional cash transfers or CCTs – combine income 
transfers with preferential access to health or education services. The programme is centrally run 
by a federal agency that identifies and selects programme beneficiaries (see Section 4 below). That 
agency also coordinates payments, monitoring systems, and service delivery with ministries and 
agencies at federal and state level. Thus, whilst the federal government is responsible for making 
payments and coordinating policy, state governments are in charge of the direct provision of health 
and education services. Human development programmes explicitly aim at both reducing extreme 
poverty and promoting investments in human capital, particularly amongst children. These two 
policy objectives are linked to co-responsibilities that consist in requiring parents to send their 
children to school and attend periodical health checkups.  
 
3.1 Targeting extreme poverty 
 
The first policy objective, i.e. reducing extreme poverty, is a distinctive feature of social assistance 
programmes in Latin America. Unlike food subsidies and other development interventions in the 
past, these programmes aim at protecting basic levels of consumption of the poor and most 
vulnerable. There is an important political economy dimension associated with social assistance 
focusing on the extremely poor. Shared perceptions and values about the causes of extreme 
deprivation can play a role in persuading political constituencies to support policy interventions that 
assist the poor (Barrientos and Neff, forthcoming). This was actually what happened in Mexico. A 
generalised consensus about the urgent need to tackle poverty, and the emerging evidence 
pointing at significant impacts from Progresa (see Section 5 below), persuaded the incoming 
conservative Fox administration (2000-2006) to keep, and subsequently expand the programme 
(and rename it thereafter Oportunidades) to urban areas. In Brazil, President Lula signed a law in 
2004 that introduced the notion of universal basic income for all; however, due to budgetary 
                                                 
3 In 2002, the Inter-American Development Bank agreed a US$1 billion loan to Progresa-Oportunidades, the 
largest loan ever made by the bank to a poverty reduction programme, and in 2005 the loan was renewed for 
US$1.2 billion for another four years (Levy, 2006). In January 2010, the government announced an 
expansion of Progresa-Oportunidades to cover an additional 600,000 low-income households, primarily in 
urban areas. However, as the budgetary capacity of the Mexican government had been severely constrained 
as result of the global financial crisis, the expansion of the programme was financed with public borrowing: a 
US$1.5 billion fixed-spread loan from the World Bank and a US$600 million loan from the inter-American 
Development Bank (see Barrientos and Nino-Zarazua, forthcoming). 
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constraints, it was decided that the focus of Bolsa Familia would be on the poorest first, as they 
were the most urgently in need of support.  
 
The judgement about assisting the poorest with social assistance has a strong foundation in 
principles of social justice. Welfare economics suggests that policies focusing on the poorest are 
welfare-enhancing. This means that an additional unit of income transferred to the worst-off would 
produce a greater benefit than the same additional unit of income transferred to be better-off. In 
other words, “a dollar that helps us avoid poverty is more valuable that a dollar that helps us 
become very rich” (Rabin, 2000: 1281). The effectiveness of social assistance programmes in 
reaching out to the poor is largely contingent on the methods for the identification and selection of 
the intended beneficiaries. In Section 4, I return to this issue.  
 
3.2 Facilitating human capital investment 
 
The second policy objective of Progresa-Oportunidades, i.e. promoting investments in human 
capital, is based on strong theoretical principles and empirical evidence showing that the formation 
of human capital, through improvements in education, health and nutrition, plays a central role in 
enhancing people’s capacity to produce, interact with their peers and integrate in society. On the 
contrary, poor nutrition, poor health and limited schooling are associated with low labour 
productivity, low incomes, and ‘vicious cycles’ of poverty. In low-income countries, 43 percent of 
children aged five and under are underweight and the prevalence of malnutrition is often two to 
three times higher among the poorest income quintile (Wagstaff and Watanabe, 2000). There is 
also systematic evidence that poor households are less likely to be in a position to support their 
children’s education (World Bank, 2006). Children who do not have the opportunity to complete 
their basic education are also likely to face a lifetime of poverty (Hoddinott and Quisumbing, 2003).  
 
Social assistance programmes become critical in that context, as they can relax households’ 
budget constraints while encouraging human capital investment. Indeed, empirical evidence shows 
that human development programmes in Latin America have allowed poor households to increase 
the quantity and quality of food they consume. They also seem to have facilitated intra-household 
time reallocation, so that their children can go to school (see Section 5 below). More schooling and 
better health and nutrition for children can translate into greater future productivity, higher economic 
development and social mobility. The complementarities between nutrition, health and education, 
and the spillover effects and positive externalities emerging in labour and credit markets, are key to 
understanding the expansion of social assistance, in terms of scale and global coverage, with a 
human development focus. 
 
But while design features, particularly the so-called conditionalities, have dominated the discussion 
surrounding human development programmes in Latin America, issues of coverage, scale and 
transfer size, regularity and duration of support are of much greater significance. The theoretical 
principles underpinning conditionalities in social assistance rely on the assumption that under 
situations of extreme deprivation, households heavily discount children’s future consumption on 
healthcare and education. In those contexts, conditionalities are expected to price up the 
underestimated value of service utilisation and, therefore, have a greater impact on household 
welfare than unconditional transfers. However, the evidence on this is inconclusive. While 
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conditions are reported to increase service utilisation more than unconditional transfers in Latin 
America (see e.g. de Brauw and Hoddinott, 2008, Schady and Araujo, 2006, Bourguignon et al., 
2003), other studies show that unconditional transfers can also have positive impacts on household 
welfare (Duflo, 2000, UNICEF, 2000). Few controlled experimental studies are currently being 
conducted to compare the effects of conditional and unconditional transfers, and they may provide 
further evidence on this particular subject. The marginal costs and benefits of enforcing 
conditionalities are not fully known either, and more empirical work is needed on this area. 
Nonetheless, the idea of households’ co-responsibilities in tackling poverty have played an 
important role in gaining public support to expand social assistance, particularly at early stages of 
institutional development of pioneer programmes such as Progresa-Oportunidades, as rigorous 
impact evaluations were not available at the time. In the following section, I discuss the features 
that characterise the institutional design of Progresa-Oportunidades.  
 
4.   Institutional design4 
 
The effectiveness of Progresa-Oportunidades has been largely contingent on the methods adopted 
for the identification and selection of beneficiaries. The programme developed complex systems of 
identification and selection, with the specific objective of improving the efficacy of policy outreach 
and avoiding its politicisation, as it occurred in the past with other social policies. These systems 
involve the geographic selection of poor areas using census-based marginality index, categorical 
criteria to identify poor households using socioeconomic survey and census data, and proxy-means 
tests to select beneficiaries.  
 
4.1 Scale and coverage 
 
Budget restrictions made it necessary for the Mexican government to roll out the programme 
gradually. In 1997, Progresa was introduced in rural areas, in selected regions and only in localities 
with school and health infrastructure, as its multidimensional approach to poverty required the 
provision of public services. About 300,000 households living in 6,344 rural communities received 
support. The programme focused on rural localities first, as a large percentage of households in 
poverty lived in rural localities. By 2000, before the Presidential elections of July 2000, the rollout 
phase of the programme was completed, reaching nearly 2.5 million households living in 53,232 
communities (see Table 1). However, by focusing exclusively on rural areas, Progresa was de facto 
excluding the urban poor, who remained disqualified to receive support simply for not having lived 
in the selected geographical settings. At the same time, the requirement that communities 
possessed the necessary public infrastructure excluded remote rural areas with poor infrastructure. 
The human development focus of the programme also militated against the inclusion of households 
without children. These induced ‘exclusion errors’ were key in persuading the Fox administration to 
modify the programme to include other vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, and extend it to 
urban areas in 2003.5  
 
 
                                                 
4 This section borrows from the discussion in Section 3 in Barrientos & Niño-Zarazúa (forthcoming-a). 
5 For a detailed discussion, see Skoufias (2005). 
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Table 1. Coverage and scale of Progresa-Oportunidades 
Year Municipalities Localities Beneficiary 
households 
1997 357 6,344 300,700 
1998 1,750 40,711 1,595,500 
1999 2,155 53,152 2,306,300 
2000 2,166 53,232 2,476,430 
2001 2,310 67,539 3,116,042 
2002 2,354 70,520 4,240,000 
2003 2,360 70,436 4,240,000 
2004 2,429 82,973 5,000,000 
2005 2,435 86,091 5,000,000 
2006 2,441 92,672 5,000,000 
2007 2,444 92,961 5,000,000 
2008 2,445 95,819 5,049,206 
2009 2,445 97,922 5,209,359 
2010* 2,445 103,612 5,512,086 
Source: National Coordinating Agency of Oportunidades.  
* Figures to June 2010. 
 
By June 2010, Progresa-Oportunidades covered more than 5.5 million households living in more 
than 103,600 localities, meaning that one out of every four families in Mexico received support from 
the programme. More than 70 percent of beneficiaries are regarded as extremely poor. The rapid 
expansion of the programme coincides with a steep rise in the global coverage of social assistance 
in Latin America and in the developing world. The share of the population covered by transfer 
programmes in Latin America varies from country to country. This ranges from just a fraction of 
those in poverty covered by Paraguay’s Red de Protección y Promoción Social, to nearly 40 
percent of households covered by Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano. All in all, different types 
of transfers reach in excess of 190 million poor households worldwide, with approximately 860 
million people currently benefiting directly or indirectly from social assistance (see Table 2). This 
means that social assistance has become the most important policy instrument against extreme 
deprivation at the present time. Remarkably, Progresa-Oportunidades and other programmes in 
Latin America have made a significant contribution to tackling poverty and severe deficits in 
wellbeing (see Section 5). Several factors seem to contribute to the poverty effectiveness of social 
assistance, but especially important are transfer size, regularity of transfers and duration of support.  
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Table 2. Coverage of social assistance in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Programme title Country Type 
Number 
of house-
holds 
(millions) 
Number of 
beneficiar-
ies 
(millions) 
Income 
 group 1/ 
Poverty 
focus 2/ 
Bolsa Familia 
(absorbed Bolsa 
Escola in 2003 and 
Child Labour 
Eradication in 2006) 
Brazil 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
12.5 52.30 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Prêvidencia Rural Brazil 
Pure 
income 
7.5 37.50 
Upper 
middle 
income 
Categor-
ical 
Progresa-
Oportunidades 
Mexico 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
5.5 27.50 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Beneficio de 
Prestaçao 
Continuada 
Brazil 
Pure 
income 
2.4 10.00 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Bono Juancito Pinto Bolivia 
Pure 
income 
1.8 9.00 
Lower 
middle 
income 
High 
Familias en Accion Colombia 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
1.5 7.50 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Programa Familias 
para la inclusión 
social 
Argentina 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
0.7 7.50 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Bono de Desarrollo 
Humano (Bono 
Solidario) 
Ecuador 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
1.2 6.00 
Lower 
middle 
income 
High 
Generalización de la 
asignación familiar 
por hijo 
Argentina 
Pure 
income 
 5.75 
Upper 
middle 
income 
Moderate 
Programa de Apoyo 
Alimentario (PAL) 
Mexico 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
0.825 4.13 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
70 y mas (non-
contributory pension) 
Mexico 
Pure 
income 
2 4.00 
Upper 
middle 
income 
Categor-
ical 
 
Régimen No 
Contributivo de 
Pensiones por Monto 
Básico 
 
 
Costa 
Rica 
 
 
Pure 
income 
 
 
0.79 
 
 
3.95 
 
 
Upper 
middle 
income 
 
 
High 
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Pensiones 
Asistenciales -
became Pensiones 
Solidarias 2009  
Chile 
Pure 
income 
0.7 3.50 
Upper 
middle 
income 
Moderate 
Bono Dignidad Bolivia 
Pure 
income 
0.676 3.38 
Lower 
middle 
income 
Categor-
ical 
Programa de 
Atención a 
Jornaleros Agrícolas 
(PAJA) 
Mexico 
Public 
works  
0.65 3.25 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Asignación Familiar Uruguay 
Pure 
income 
0.522 2.61 
Upper 
middle 
income 
Categor-
ical 
Mi Familia Progresa 
Guatema
-la 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
0.478 2.39 
Lower 
middle 
income 
High 
Programa 
Solidaridad 
Domin-
ican 
Republic 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
0.46 2.30 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Programa Juntos Peru 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
0.421 2.11 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Chile Solidario Chile 
Integrated 
Antipoverty 
0.335 1.68 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Programme of 
Advancement 
through Health and 
Education 
Jamaica 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
0.318 1.59 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Programa de Empleo 
Temporal (PET) 
Mexico 
Public 
works  
0.25 1.25 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Bono Madre Niño 
and Bono Juana 
Azurduy de Padilla 
Bolivia 
Pure 
income 
1.2 1.20 
Lower 
middle 
income 
High 
Subidio Unico 
Familiar 
Chile 
Pure 
income 
1.2 1.20 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
PRAF II Honduras 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
0.17 0.85 
Lower 
middle 
income 
High 
Juntos Colombia 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
0.1 0.71 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
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Avancemos 
Costa 
Rica 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
0.131 0.66 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Programa de 
Ampliación de 
Cobertura de la 
Educación 
Secundaria (PACES) 
Colombia 
Pure 
income 
0.13 0.63 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Tekopora/PROPAIS 
II 
Paraguay 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
0.12 0.60 
Lower 
middle 
income 
High 
Plan de Atención 
Nacional a la 
Emergencia Social – 
PANES 
Uruguay 
Integrated 
antipoverty 
0.083 0.42 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Red Solidaria 
El 
Salvador 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
0.08 0.40 
Lower 
middle 
income 
High 
Pensiones 
Asistenciales 
Argentina 
Pure 
income 
0.075 0.35 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Programa de 
Pensiones No-
Contributivas 
Uruguay 
Pure 
income 
0.06 0.32 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Red de 
Oportunidades 
Panama 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
0.07 0.26 
Upper 
middle 
income 
High 
Target Conditional 
Cash Transfer 
Programme (TCCTP) 
Trinidad 
and 
Tobago 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
0.032 0.16 High income High 
Red de Protección y 
Promoción Social 
Paraguay 
Income 
transfer 
plus 
0.009 0.05 
Lower 
middle 
income 
High 
Total Latin America 
and the Caribbean 
  46.63 214.97   
TOTAL developing 
world   172.65 863.27   
1/ This column classifies countries by income groups according to 2009 gross national income 
(GNI) per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method. The groups are: 1) Low income, 
$995 or less; lower middle income, $996–3,945; upper middle income, $3,946–12,195; and high 
income, $12,196 or more.  
2/ Poverty focus has three categories: High if targeted on extreme poverty or poverty; (ii) moderate 
if it covers some of the non-poor; (iii) categorical covering poor and non-poor. 
Source: Barrientos, Niño-Zarazúa and Maitrot (2010) and World Bank. 
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4.2 Transfer size 
 
Transfer size is connected with programmes objectives and the principles underpinning programme 
design choices. Among human development programmes in Latin America, the generosity of 
transfers varies considerably. Measured as percentage of household income, transfers range from 
six percent in Brazil to nearly 20 percent in Mexico (Grosh et al., 2008). Transfer size can be 
important in determining the poverty effectiveness of social assistance programmes. Larger 
transfers are likely to have greater effects on poverty, but with limits. The results from some studies 
suggest that ceteris paribus the marginal social return to transfer size – in terms of increasing 
schooling, improving nutritional and health status, or reducing poverty – may become lower at high 
levels of transfers (see e.g. Filmer and Schady, 2009, Bourguignon et al., 2003).  There is an 
important gender dimension worth noting here. First, income transfers are given to mothers under 
the explicit assumption that women are effective agents of social change, given that they are found 
to be more committed to the wellbeing of their children than men (Dwyer and Bruce, 1988, Gómez-
Hermosillo, 2005). Second, the size of the educational grant for girls increases with school 
progression. This is with the explicit objective of providing incentives to keep girls at school to 
reduce gender inequalities at secondary and high education.  
 
4.3 Regularity and duration 
 
Regular, predictable and reliable income transfers provide a minimum level of security that is 
essential for consumption smoothing and medium- and longer-term investment decisions. Empirical 
evidence suggests that regular transfers can relax credit constraints. In Brazil, the regularity of 
Prêvidencia Social Rural, which was introduced to cover informal workers, has enabled pensioners 
to access bank loans, as the membership to the programme seems to have reduced screening and 
other informational costs to lenders (Schwarzer, 2000). Similar effects are reported from Bolivia 
(Martinez, 2007), where a large percentage of beneficiaries of social pensions have invested part of 
their transfer in small-scale enterprises, livestock and productive assets to support their 
households. In that context, social transfers are a critical element for protecting the poor and 
vulnerable.                                                            
 
As regards transfer duration, there is no rule of thumb to guide policy, as the optimal length of 
assistance may be contingent on the targeted population and the socioeconomic context. 
Households facing extreme poverty are more likely to require a longer time window of support to 
tackle accumulated deficits in productive capacity and basic capability. Human development 
programmes in Latin America provide support to the poorest families for a period long enough to 
build human capital amongst beneficiary children. Progresa-Oportunidades, for example, makes 
payments in cash at distribution points6 every two months, and for periods that can last for several 
years until children graduate from high school. The timing of policy is also important here. 
Nutritional and health interventions in early life are significant determinants for improving the 
productive capacity of people in adulthood. This connects to the issue of breaking the 
                                                 
6 In 2003, Progresa-Oportunidades, together with a Bansefi and a network of savings and credit cooperatives 
and microfinance institutions, began a programme to distribute payments through electronic accounts in 
nearly 1,800 branches that the network has across the country. By 2010, half a million households had 
received Oportunidades through debit cards.  
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intergenerational transmission mechanisms of persistent deprivation. The real value of transfers is 
important too, as inflationary pressures can erode the purchasing power of transfers and undermine 
their effectiveness. In the next section, I briefly review the impact evidence emerging from 
Progresa-Oportunidades and other transfer programmes in Latin America. 
 
5 Impact evaluation of Progresa-Oportunidades and other social assistance 
programmes in Latin America 
 
The rigorous and independent evaluation protocol of Progresa-Oportunidades has been one of its 
hallmarks. It marked a precedent to the general practice that characterised previous antipoverty 
policies in Mexico – and in most developing countries. Indeed, until the introduction of Progresa-
Oportunidades, social spending was hardly subjected to rigorous evaluations, meaning that 
governments lacked reliable information to assess whether programmes worked, and to take 
decisions to improve policy effectiveness. The decision to incorporate an experimental design to 
the impact evaluation protocol – opened to public scrutiny – also meant that impact results could be 
treated as reliable and detached from political manipulation. Indeed, impact studies played an 
important role in making the case to sustain Progresa-Oportunidades during the political transition 
of 2000. The evaluation protocol also set a precedent in Mexico to assess social policy, and 
prompted other countries to adopt similar impact evaluation policies.   
 
In the remainder of this section, I discuss the impact evidence emerging from Progresa-
Oportunidades and other social assistance programmes in Latin America. I pay attention to the 
effects on human capital and poverty, as these are two key policy objectives.7 Section 5.1 reviews 
impact studies on nutrition; Section 5.2 presents evidence on health; Section 5.3 reviews evidence 
on schooling, and Section 5.4 discusses the impacts on poverty. The sections below cannot review 
the available evidence in full but, instead, aim at outlining the general findings associated with 
these wellbeing dimensions. By and large, the focus is on quantitative studies, as their 
methodology facilitates a comparative discussion across countries and programmes.  
 
5.1 Impacts on nutrition  
 
Nutrition plays a central role in enhancing human development. A well balanced diet is the 
foundation for healthy living and a central input for labour productivity. Good nutrition is especially 
important for young children, as critical cognitive developments take place at an early age (see 
Alderman et al., 2006, Glewwe and King, 2001). Child (mal)nutrition is normally measured with the 
use of anthropometric data. Weight for age provides insights into the short-term impact of improved 
nutrition, whereas height for age provides information on the long-term effects of improved nutrition. 
Height for age is particularly informative as regards the longer-term impact of social transfers, as 
studies have consistently found that height deficits originated in early life are associated with limited 
cognitive development (Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2001), and low future earning capacity (Thomas and 
Strauss, 1997). 
 
                                                 
7 For a detailed review of the impact of social assistance programmes, see International Labour Office 
(2010). 
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Evaluation studies of Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades find that children exposed to the 
programme gained one centimetre in height for age compared a control group, two years after the 
start of the programmes. The gain was 0.65cm six years after the start of the programme (Neufeld 
et al., 2005). In Ecuador, households receiving support from Bono de Desarrollo Humano had a 25 
percent increase in food expenditure, which was linked to improvements in nutritional status (Ponce 
and Bedi, 2009). In Colombia, a substantial increase in intake of protein-rich foods and vegetables 
was reported as a result of participation in Familias en Acción (Attanasio, 2003). Changes in 
consumption especially benefited small children: 12-month-old boys grew 0.44 centimetres more 
than similar children who did not benefit from the transfer. Evidence on improvements in nutritional 
status as a result of transfer programmes is strong across countries and throughout different types 
of programmes. Overall, studies confirm a direct link between social assistance and food 
consumption, where evidence is particularly strong in terms of improvements in child nutrition.  
 
5.2 Impacts on health 
 
By design, human development programmes in Latin America have the objective of improving the 
access to, and utilisation of, health services as a direct means of improving the health status of 
programme beneficiaries. Overall, programmes appear to have met their objectives. An evaluation 
of Colombia’s Familias en Acción reports a rise in the percentage of children under 24 months 
attending health care check-ups (Attanasio et al., 2005). Improved utilisation of healthcare facilities 
directly affects morbidity rates. The proportion of children affected by diarrhoea declined from 32 
percent to 22 percent among children under 24 months, and from 21.3 percent to 10.4 percent 
among older children.  
 
Similar improvements in healthcare utilisation have been reported from Mexico, Chile and 
Nicaragua. In Mexico, Progresa-Oportunidades is reported to have doubled the per capita health-
care visits in rural communities A study of Chile Solidario reports that preventative healthcare 
amongst children living in rural areas improved in the order of a four to six percentage points 
(Galasso, 2006). In Nicaragua, Red de Protección Social was associated with an 18 percent 
increase in immunisation amongst children aged 12-23 months (Maluccio and Flores, 2004). In-
time immunisations can play a significant role in reducing illness and premature deaths amongst 
toddlers. In Mexico, a study reports a 12 percent lower incidence of illness amongst children 
receiving support from Progresa-Oportunidades vis-à-vis a corresponding control group (Skoufias, 
2005). 
 
 
5.3 Impacts on schooling  
 
The design of Progresa-Oportunidades has been shaped by the knowledge that reducing poverty 
requires effective policy instruments to improve schooling amongst the poor. Studies have found a 
strong correlation between the programme and several education-related outcomes, including 
higher school enrolment rates, less grade repetition, better grade progression, lower dropout rates, 
and higher school re-entry rates among dropouts. The impact was especially notable in rural areas, 
where the number of children entering the first grade of secondary school rose by 85 percent and 
second grade by 47 percent (Molyneux, 2007). Dropout rates decreased by 24 percent, with a 
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corresponding rise in completion rates of 23 percent for rural secondary schools (Skoufias and di 
Maro, 2005). These results predict an increase in children’s future permanent earnings by about 
eight percent when they reach adulthood (see Freije et al., 2006).   
 
In middle-income countries, where enrolment in primary education is nearly universal, the impact of 
social assistance has been more significant on secondary education (see e.g. Attanasio et al., 
2005, Cardoso and Portela Souza, 2003, Schady and Araujo, 2006). The extent to which these 
changes translate into improvements in knowledge and reduction in intergenerational transmissions 
of poverty is, however, more difficult to confirm at present. Schooling is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition to ensure that beneficiary children reach the labour markets with improved 
educational attainment levels. The quality of education and the functioning of domestic labour 
markets are also important.  
 
5.4 Impacts on poverty 
 
A key objective of social assistance in Latin America is to reduce poverty. There is a large literature 
assessing the poverty reduction effectiveness of these programmes. The findings from these 
studies cover social transfers of different typology and operating in different settings. In Mexico, an 
evaluation of Progresa-Oportunidades showed a small reduction in the poverty headcount ratio –in 
the order of ten percent after two years of programme implementation; however, a large reduction 
in the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap8 was reported with reductions in the order of 30 
and 45 per cent, respectively (Skoufias, 2005, Hoddinott et al., 2000). This is confirmed by more 
recent studies which find greater impacts on the poverty gap and poverty severity than on the 
headcount index (see e.g. Cortes et al., 2007). At the national level, the programme is reported to 
have reduced about one percent in terms of the food-based poverty line, while in rural areas, the 
poverty impact has been between two to three times greater than the one observed nationwide. 
Many other impact studies conducted in Latin America consistently confirm positive impacts of 
social assistance on poverty and food security.9 
 
More recently, and amid the global financial crisis, some critics have questioned the effectiveness 
of Progresa-Oportunidades in addressing poverty. Between 2006 and 2008, the headcount index 
that measures the food-based poverty incidence increased from 13.8 percent to 18.2 percent, 
whereas the capability-based poverty incidence, which in addition to the food-based basket 
includes other expenditure items such as healthcare, education, clothing, housing and public 
transport, increased from 20.7 percent to 25.1 percent. However, the setback in poverty reduction 
                                                 
8 The poverty gap measures the mean distance below the poverty line or income threshold that separates the 
poor from the non-poor, as a proportion of the poverty line, where the mean is taken over the entire 
population, counting the non-poor as having zero poverty gap. In order words, the poverty gap is an indicator 
of poverty intensity, reflecting the amount of income that would be needed to bring the poor above the 
poverty line, i.e. to eliminate poverty. Whilst the poverty gap measures the distance that separates the poor 
from the poverty line, the squared poverty gap measures the squared of that distance and can be seen as an 
indicator of poverty severity. The squared poverty gap takes inequality amongst the poor into account by 
giving more weight to the poorest.  
9 For the case of Brazil’s Bolsa Familia, see Lindertet al. (2007);  for a discussion on Ecuador’s Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano, see Ponce (2008); for a study of Colombia’s Familias en Acción, see Attanasio et al. 
(2005); and for studies of social pensions in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Bolivia, see Bertranou et al. 
(2002),  and Bertranou and Grushka (2002).  
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can be attributed to the level of systemic vulnerabilities that Mexico and other developing countries 
have faced against covariate shocks. In particular, the increase in international food prices, 
especially staples, that averaged 43 percent between March 2007 and March 2008 (FAO, 2008) 
caused an annual growth in the food basket values of about 18 percent in 2008. This had a 
significant negative income effect on households at the lowest income quintile. And with the global 
spread of the financial crisis, the net per capita income experienced a fall of nearly 13 percent 
between 2006 and 2008, with remittances and wages dropping by 29 percent and 26 percent, 
respectively (see Consejo Nacional de Evaluacion de la Politica de Desarrollo Social, 2009). These 
figures are likely to have just partially captured the full extent of the impact of the financial crisis, as 
the GDP growth rate fell by -6 percent in 2009.  
 
It is worth noting here that the income contribution of Progresa-Oportunidades to poor households 
increased by 20 percent, which reflects the direct public intervention introduced in 2008 to address 
food insecurity in the country (Barrientos and Niño-Zarazúa, forthcoming-b). Moreover, it is 
estimated that in the absence of Progresa-Oportunidades and other social protection programmes 
in the country, the food-based headcount index would have increased by 13.5 percent, which 
represents about 2.6 million additional people in extreme poverty, 2.2 million of whom would have 
lived in rural areas and 0.4 million in urban areas (Consejo Nacional de Evaluacion de la Politica de 
Desarrollo Social, 2009). So although covariate shocks are at the root of the recent poverty 
increase in Mexico, poverty would have been much higher had Progresa-Oportunidades not been 
in place. 
 
There is often an expectation that social transfers could have effects beyond the reduction of 
poverty and contribute to reducing income inequality. Transfer programmes in Sweden and other 
countries are generally referred to as having effectively contributed to reducing income inequalities. 
But it is often forgotten that coverage and size of these programmes are of a different order of 
magnitude to the ones operating in Latin America and other developing countries. Moreover, the 
Gini coefficient of Scandinavian countries is significantly lower than in Latin American countries. 
Nonetheless, and with a share of about 0.5 percent of gross domestic product in Brazil and Mexico, 
social transfer programmes are reported to have contributed to a 21 percent reduction of income 
inequality, in relative terms (Soares et al., 2007). Other studies of Brazil’s Bolsa Familia ((Lindert et 
al., 2007) and Beneficio de Prestaçao Continuada (Soares et al., 2006), also report contributions of 
these programmes in relative reductions in the Gini coefficient. However, the distributional 
argument should not be mistaken. The contribution of these programmes to an absolute reduction 
in the aggregate Gini coefficient is marginal. In 2001, for instance, Brazil’s, Mexico’s and Chile’s 
Gini coefficients were in the order of 0.58, 0.51 and 0.55, respectively. By 2007, the Gini coefficient 
of these countries had gone down, marginally, to 0.55, 0.51 and 0.52, respectively (World Bank, 
2010). This is simply because the lowest deciles of the income distribution receive a very small 
share of the aggregate income. Nevertheless, as pointed out above, evidence shows that these 
programmes can contribute to addressing inequality among the poor, via reductions in the poverty 
gap and the squared poverty gap.  
 
All in all, the brief review of impact studies presented above shows that social assistance makes a 
significant contribution to reducing poverty and facilitating human capital investment. The capacity 
of social assistance in improving wellbeing outcomes is, nonetheless, heterogeneous across 
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programmes, target groups, and socioeconomic environments. It seems to be associated with 
design factors, programme objectives, and institutional and financial considerations.  
 
6 Conclusions  
 
The analysis of Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades and other social assistance programmes in Latin 
America shows that these programmes are effective in addressing poverty and severe deficits in 
wellbeing. They have led to an important shift in antipoverty policy thinking, moving from food aid 
and subsidies to reliable and predictable forms of assistance. Important policy lessons can be 
drawn from the discussion presented above. 
 
First, the emergence of social assistance reflects important advancements in the conventional 
wisdom on the causes of extreme poverty. Human development programmes have paid special 
attention to reducing extreme poverty and facilitating human capital investment. The latter is 
particularly relevant to tackling the intergenerational transmission mechanisms of persistent 
deprivation.  
 
Second, design features have relied on strong theoretical principles underpinning programmes’ 
objectives. In particular, they justify the focus on the poor and the multidimensional approach to 
poverty. This is in clear contrast to food aid in-kind subsidies that dominated antipoverty 
interventions in the past.  
 
Third, the success of Progresa-Oportunidades and other transfer programmes in Latin America 
must be understood in a broader context. For Mexico, the harsh economic and political 
environment that preceded the introduction of Progresa-Oportunidades, coupled with a rapid 
democratisation and increasing political competition, laid down the foundations for the introduction 
and then sustained expansion of the programme.  
 
Fourth, well-designed systems of identification and selection of beneficiaries have set a precedent 
in several Latin American countries to prevent discretionary political manipulation that characterised 
past social policies. That has helped to generate political legitimacy and support across the political 
spectrum.  
 
Fifth, limited financial resources also meant that the incumbent government had the political 
motivation to replace highly regressive and ineffective food and in-kind subsidies, and that political 
decisions prevented the government from incurring additional costs when Progresa-Oportunidades 
was rolled out. Financing has emerged as a key constraint in extending social assistance in Latin 
America and developing countries as a whole. The fiscal space to sustain social assistance is 
conditional on the size of economy, the efficiency of tax collection systems and the scale and scope 
of the interventions. For most countries in Latin America, public spending on social assistance 
average one percent of GDP, although low-income countries face the greatest challenge to 
financing social assistance. 
 
Finally, the inclusion of rigorous impact evaluation protocols has meant that governments can test 
and improve programmes’ effectiveness, while strengthening their legitimacy across different 
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political actors. Overall, the experience of Mexico’s Progresa-Oportunidades has shown that the 
interaction between government, research community, bilaterals and multilaterals is paramount to 
advancing knowledge in the area of poverty to increase impact and improve policy and practice.  
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